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A cornerstone of effective disaster management is that response should always begin 
and end at the local level (1). The response to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak 
in Liberia, West Africa, was a combination of independent efforts by many nations and 
organizations. Many of these independent efforts ignored or were not able to work with 
the local levels of emergency management in Liberia. This oversight occurred because 
of the Liberian’s mistrust of both their government and foreign aid groups, as well as 
the lack of cultural competency demonstrated by the aid groups. The health-care and 
emergency management infrastructure in Liberia appeared to be non-existent at the 
beginning of the EVD outbreak. However, there were resources available at the com-
munity level: the Liberians and their culture. Although these resources were rarely used, 
there were some instances in which communities were included in response efforts. It 
was in these instances that possible improvements to international disaster response 
protocol were found.
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iNtrODUctiON
Effective disaster management consists of a continuous cycle of four activities: mitigation, prepar-
edness, response, and recovery (2). Liberia’s limited government and health-care infrastructure 
prevented both mitigation of hazards and preparedness for incidents. As a result, the response to the 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak was reactive rather than a coordinated effort of well thought out 
and exercised plans, policies, and procedures. Despite the fact that the outbreak’s management relied 
solely on response, key disaster management theories were disregarded throughout the international 
aid groups’ response to the outbreak.
Traditionally, incident response begins and ends at the local level (1, 2). It is when the resources 
of the localities are depleted that a scaled-up response occurs. Assistance is then requested by the 
local leaders (e.g., mayor, governor, etc.), prompting regional, state, federal, or international partners 
to become involved in response to supplement the locals. The issue in Liberia was that international 
aid groups supplanted rather than supporting the local level (3).
The utilization of local emergency response is a fundamental tenant of emergency management 
theory (4, 5). Organizing response through local groups is taught in many countries, including the 
United States, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and many others (6). During the 2014 
EVD response in Liberia, this practice was not actively utilized by international aid groups. Many 
potential resources were lost because of this oversight. The response to the EVD outbreak could 
have been improved by adapting traditional methods of emergency response to fit into the culture 
being served. Through the inclusion of cultural competency, historical knowledge, and involvement 
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of community leaders in emergency management, it may be 
possible to create a methodology of response that can be used in 
future international aid (7). The following paper will analyze the 
2014 EVD response in Liberia and postulate how improvements 
could have been made via adherence to the hallmark theory of 
emergency management: response begins and ends locally.
BAcKGrOUND
The 2014 EVD outbreak differed from previous EVD outbreak in 
Africa for three main reasons: (1) the outbreak occurred in West 
Africa (index case was in Guinea), (2) the outbreak centered in an 
urban environment, and (3) the volume of people who contracted 
the virus was more than all other outbreaks combined (8). EVD 
spread rapidly throughout metropolitan Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia (8). As of April 2016, West Africa had reported 
28,616 cases of confirmed, probable, and suspected EVD infected 
persons with 11,310 resulting mortalities (9).
Liberia faced many challenges in their attempt to control EVD 
transmission. Their public health and medical infrastructure was 
decimated following two civil wars and political instability. In 
fact, of the 293 public health facilities in Liberia, only 51 survived 
the wars and only 30 physicians were left to serve over 3 mil-
lion people (10, 11). A 2010 study of Liberia’s public health and 
medical infrastructure found that only 6 of 19 health facilities in 
4 Liberian counties had cell phone or radio capability (12). This 
lack of infrastructure was unresolved in the months and years 
leading up to the EVD outbreak.
Since the end of the second civil war, Liberia has relied primar-
ily on foreign aid and donations to finance their health budget 
and strengthen the county’s infrastructure (10, 13). Most of the 
funding granted to the Liberian government was used to build the 
Liberian military in an effort to enforce political stability and pro-
mote national security for Liberian citizens (13). Unfortunately, 
this practice was viewed with suspicion by the Liberian public 
given the amount of civil unrest following the civil war.
Mistrust of Sirleaf ’s administration by Liberians grew fol-
lowing her reelection. Many Liberians began to see similarities 
between her and other West African dictators. A stagnant educa-
tion system, non-existent health-care infrastructure, unemploy-
ment rates as high as 80%, and the assignment of Sirleaf ’s family 
members to important government positions contributed to 
this mistrust (13). Post-conflict Liberia has understandably 
continued to mistrust their government, despite a decade of 
what were purportedly democratic elections (13). The continued 
growth of the Liberian military and its involvement in enforcing 
quarantine during the EVD outbreak has only perpetuated this 
mistrust (13).
iNterNAtiONAL resPONse issUes 
iDeNtiFieD
international Aid Leadership
International assistance was delayed throughout West Africa by 
the lack of leadership and coordinated response. Since 2006, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) has been transitioning from 
active response and practical disease control to a more passive 
role of setting guidelines and recommendations. This shift in the 
WHO’s policy was expedited by the overreaction to the H1N1 
pandemic in 2009 (14). Ultimately, the WHO’s step back from 
proactive aid and immediate decision making led to hesitation 
in declaring the EVD outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC) (15). While the legal qualifica-
tions for declaring an event a PHEIC were met in March 2014, 
the WHO did not do so until August (14, 16). This 5-month delay, 
in conjunction with the absence of health infrastructure in the 
region, led to unnecessary morbidity and mortality by unneces-
sarily extending the time of uncontrolled EVD transmission.
The WHO traditionally would have coordinated the inter-
national response but was hesitant to take an active role in the 
EVD outbreak control. The response was not coordinated. No one 
organization or entity was able to implement the use of Ebola 
treatment centers (ETCs) effectively throughout the region (14). 
In response to the WHO’s delay, the UN attempted to establish a 
unified international response; however, they were not prepared 
to manage the response of a multinational outbreak (14, 17). The 
thrown-together Liberian health-care infrastructure created by 
multiple aid groups fell apart quickly.
Health-care resources
Furthermore, the rapid spread of EVD throughout urban areas of 
Liberia was perpetuated by a number of problems faced by both 
local and international responders. These problems compounded 
the outbreak by preventing effective isolation (the removal of 
infected individuals from a population) and quarantine (the 
removal of exposed individuals from a population) (2). The use 
of ETCs in Liberia and the rest of Western Africa was vital to the 
reduction of EVD transmission during the outbreak. At the most 
severe points of the outbreak in Liberia, all health-care facilities 
were overcrowded (14).
The trust of Liberian citizens was further challenged by the 
attempts of international aid groups to reduce EVD transmis-
sions and their inability to treat ill patients. The establishment 
of health-care facilities in Liberia’s affected urban areas was 
necessary to both treat diseased patients and isolate infected 
ones. Many foreign countries, non-governmental organizations, 
and other aid groups independently built ETCs—an effort loosely 
coordinated through the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (14).
The first group to construct ETCs was Medecins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF). MSF had over 10 years of experience treating 
rural and technologically removed populations for EVD and 
Ebola-like diseases. ETC plans and supply lists were rapidly 
available when the EVD outbreak became evident. MSF ETCs 
were utilized effectively throughout the outbreak (14). Red Cross 
Red Crescent was similarly experienced in treating populations 
with EVD and was able to set up ETCs in September, 2014, early 
enough to effectively isolate and treat patients (14).
Mobile laboratories from the United States and the United 
Kingdom were established early enough in the outbreak to assist 
in the diagnosis of patients during the height of the outbreak 
(14). These labs aided in confirming EVD infection in patients 
(14). Additionally, the United Kingdom built mobile tents similar 
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to those used by MSF—by November, 2014, six UK tents were 
operational in Sierra Leone (14).
In contrast, there were some aid efforts that were not as success-
ful. The United States sent 3,000 soldiers to Liberia to construct 
ETCs (14). A total of 17 treatment centers were built, generating 
a total of 1,700 beds (17). Unfortunately, these facilities were not 
fully utilized because there were no health-care workers available 
in Liberia to staff the centers and the centers were completed 
after the peak of EVD infection in Liberia (14). The American aid 
organization Samaritan’s Purse had to close their ETC in Liberia 
when two aid workers became infected with EVD.
Regardless of whether successfully built and managed, ETCs 
in Liberia were overcrowded (14). Because of the lack of bed 
availability, supplies, and caregivers at ETCs in Liberia, many 
centers were not able to provide supportive care to patients (14). 
The sheer scale of the resources (e.g., physical beds, staff, IV 
fluids) needed to treat over 10,000 patients in Liberia is difficult 
to predict, let alone supply (9, 18).
Patients and their families quickly realized that the infected 
persons would be isolated in the ETCs, but that they would not 
be provided supportive care. This compounded the trust issues 
Liberians had for the government and international aid groups. 
This mistrust developed into an active avoidance of aid groups 
and ETCs in many communities, which led to the hiding of ill 
family members, non-compliance with isolation and quarantine 
protocols, and animosity toward aid groups (19).
engagement of Locals
Likewise, lack of information given to the public by interna-
tional and national aid groups prevented locals from knowing 
how to help themselves, aid the ill, and prevent transmission 
within their communities (14). Public health education cam-
paigns implemented in Liberia during the outbreak included 
community education about transmission, signs, and symptoms 
of EVD, the importance of isolating the infected persons, and 
how early diagnosis and treatment benefits the ill ones (20, 21). 
However, according to Abramowitz et  al. (16), most of these 
public health messages focused on making sure people knew 
that the EVD outbreak was occurring, and not on what people 
could do to protect themselves from infection in areas without 
a functioning health-care system. During the height of the out-
break, communities knew what EVD was and how it was spread 
but did not know how to continue working and living while the 
disease spread throughout the country (e.g., how to take care 
of family members, how to transport the ill to ETCs, and how 
to keep themselves safe when the stand-up EVD infrastructure 
failed) (16).
Since the Liberians were unable to depend on aid groups 
(either due to local mistrust or the aid groups’ lack of ability), 
West Africans learned from experience to protect themselves 
from infection through avoidance of strangers, isolation of the 
ill, and avoidance of contact with the dead (14). However, the 
establishment of this knowledge in these communities was 
severely delayed by limited information. The lack of education 
on self-sufficiency for communities extended the amount of time 
it took to control the spread of the virus.
recOMMeNDAtiONs
Utilize Locals and Local culture
In November 2014, Liberia’s Ministry of Health, the WHO, 
and the World Bank invited Liberians living in Liberia’s capital, 
Monrovia, to participate in focus groups (22). Through these dis-
cussions, the groups learned that locals did not support a planned 
incentive scheme (a reward of US$5 for every EVD case reported 
in Monrovia) but had input on solutions that would fit the needs of 
their communities within their cultural principles. For example, 
the provision of food to families in quarantine would encourage 
the public to comply with EVD transmission reduction policies. 
Additionally, ensuring communication between family members 
and patients in ETCs would make keeping track of loved ones 
more probable. Likewise, offering psychological support to those 
that have lost family members would help communities recover, 
and including EVD infection survivors in all levels of community 
recovery would reduce stigmatization of survivors throughout 
Liberia (8, 22).
Input from 386 Monrovian community leaders identified 
what a community-based approach to the EVD outbreak would 
look like if constructed when outside resources were delayed or 
unavailable (16). The study elucidated many points, as follows:
 1. Input from community leaders discovered gaps in the state 
and international responses
 2. Surveillance needed to begin within communities and by 
community members
 3. Input from community leaders created plans that sustain 
existing social structures, culture, and conflict histories.
Understanding the culture of a community can be advanta-
geous to containing the spread of EVD. For example, utilization 
of gendered roles within the communities at risk creates a more 
streamlined approach to community surveillance and treatment 
in the absence of a well-supported health infrastructure (16). 
Supporting men and women in their culturally allocated roles by 
educating women in the treatment of family members, quaran-
tine procedures, and personal protection can reduce the strain 
put on Liberia’s limited number of health-care facilities (16). 
Likewise, assigning male community members leadership roles 
in Ebola Task Forces and Block teams can prevent the spread of 
EVD throughout communities. Furthermore, giving otherwise 
unemployed, bored, and scared young men surveillance and 
community supply management roles can help prevent social 
conflict by giving them a sense of purpose within the community. 
This involvement would also increase trust, program sustainabil-
ity, and response capacity (23). In these ways, creating outbreak 
controls through response at a micro-social scale can be achieved.
create community-Developed response 
Plans
This community-developed response plan should be expanded 
upon by aid groups. In order to utilize communities’ desire to 
autonomously help themselves, aid groups need to work with 
communities in order to successfully reduce morbidity and 
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mortality. Most communities within Liberia have extremely lim-
ited resources. Therefore, it is necessary to utilize the resources 
available, the people within them, and the culture they embody. 
Doing this will ensure that community members that remain in 
the area have some knowledge of infectious disease prevention 
and therefore increase Liberia’s infrastructure and potentially 
reduce the amount of national and international aid required 
during future outbreaks.
The idea that communicating with community leaders during 
response efforts is beneficial to the overall outcome is supported 
by the actions of the Liberian Ministry of Health in the Fuamah 
District’s village of Mahwah (24). In this case, ambulance short-
ages prevented the removal of infected patients from their homes 
to ETCs, making community isolation necessary to prevent the 
spread of EVD to the rest of the district. Input from local leaders 
enabled the Fuamah District Ebola Taskforce to safely and effec-
tively quarantine the entire village (24). The case study concluded 
that both the overall national response and individual communi-
ties benefited from the integration of community leaders in the 
planning of community quarantine (24).
cONcLUsiON
Disaster and emergency management theory states that response 
should always begin and end at the local level. Throughout the 
international response to the EVD outbreak, response was han-
dled from a level far above the community—a method that may 
have exacerbated the transmission of EVD rather than reduce it. 
The lack of medical and public health infrastructure in Liberia 
created a challenge for communities but not an impossible one 
to overcome. Working with community leaders to understand 
the culture of communities and ethnic groups, as well as utilizing 
the human resources available could create a flow of surveillance 
information, increase the number of treated patients, and reduce 
the transmission of infectious disease through education of the 
public in future infectious disease outbreak. Cultural competency 
is a field that both emergency management and public health 
need to expand upon—especially when key theories and policies 
pivot on the ability to utilize local resources. When we next need 
to respond to an outbreak—or any disaster—at an international 
level, it is recommended that response involves the communities 
being affected. Furthermore, their culture should be recognized 
as an asset to bridging any gap between aid groups and the people 
they serve. The case of Ebola in Liberia demonstrates the urgent 
need for an intervention approach to future events that are spe-
cifically designed based on the cultural and social norms within 
the affected community.
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